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I
First, I would like to say something about the association
ofWittgenstein himself with the view that animals are
utterly mindless. Perhaps this interpretation can be
supported by some rather cryptic remarks that
Wittgenstein made, particularly in the Investigations.
There he denies that we could understand a lion even if
it could talk. He also says that it's senseless to suppose
a dog may hope or pretend that it is in pain. In addition,
Wittgenstein's private language argument is supposed
to show that the ability to apply concepts meaningfully
requires public criteria. And presumably the most
impressive public criteria can be provided by language.
One might conclude from this that Wittgenstein's view
is that minds require concepts and that concepts require
the public evidence oflanguage. Whatever might be said
for such a position, it is clear that it is not Wittgenstein's.
Language does make an important difference as to
what sorts of mental states a creature might realize on
Wittgenstein's view, but in the very passages often
invoked to support lack of animal mentality,
Wittgenstein explicitly acknowledges that some mental
states are possible without language:

In Animal Liberation, Peter Singer remarks that some
philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein have maintained
that we cannot meaningfully attribute conscious states
to creatures without language.! This is, as Singer
observes, a hazy line of thought at best, but it is true that
some philosophers occasionally maintain it. The moral
implications of such a view are obviously disastrous for
animals. While it is absurd to associate such an extreme
and implausible position with Wittgenstein himself, some
of his remarks do lend themselves to more moderate
positions which place serious restrictions on animal
mentality. These restrictions do have an impact, probably
a negative one, on the moral standing of animals. I do
not intend this paper to be a strict exegetical account of
Wittgenstein's own views; his remarks on these issues
are more suggestive than explicit in any case. Rather, I
want to consider a few lines of thought in the
Philosophical Investigations along with some of the
appropriations of Wittgenstein by some of his followers
on the issue of animal minds. I hope to show that their
efforts to draw a clear line distinguishing animal and
human mentality is misguided and that emphasis on
psychological continuity between the species is
evidenced in Wittgenstein's own work.
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One can imagine an animal angry, frightened,
unhappy, happy, startled. But hopeful? And
why not?
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A dog believes his master is at the door. But
can he also believe his master will come the
day after tomorrow?2

but that it is hoping you will give it a scrap?
As to simulating pain, any pet-owner and any
veterinarian can relate cases in which animals
simulated pain in order to get attention, avoid
punishment, and so on, especially if they have
been fussed over in the past when they had
an injury.3

In spite of his intention to limit the sorts of mental states
that can be reasonably attributable to animals,
Wittgenstein actually granted them rather a lot. His rlfst
statement gives examples of conscious infraverbal
mentality, since anger and happiness do not seem to be
realizable by non-conscious entities. His last claim,
while denying the possibility of certain kinds of canine
beliefs, explicitly attributes intentional states to dogs
(since even simple beliefs are intentional). So, dogs and
other animals have some intentional states as well as
some conscious ones. But, as intentionality and
consciousness are apparently the primary indicators of
mentality, it is clear enough that Wittgenstein is not
denying the possibility of animal minds.
It seems then that Wittgenstein is only contending
that some mental states are possible only for creatures
with linguistic capacity. Some beliefs, for example, are
presumably too finely grained to be attributed
reasonably to an infralinguistic organism. But that's
quite different from claiming that the creature can't have
beliefs at all. Perhaps Wittgenstein wished to deny that
animals could have long term expectations, beliefs, or
desires. But even this much is not obvious. Wittgenstein
concentrates on certain examples which are supposed
to illustrate the sort of difference that language makes
for mind. But so far as I can tell, he makes no general
claim like: "Animals can have present or short-term
cognitive states, whereas long term intentional states
require language." The reason I think Wittgenstein
avoids such generalizations is that they seem to be
subject to empirical falsification-perhaps nonlinguistic evidence of a long-term expectation could be
given. It's hard to say in a clear and general way just
what it is that animals cannot, in principle, do, on
Wittgenstein's view. This is why he concentrates on
specific examples of certain mental states which are
supposed to be dependent on language in various ways.
But even some of the limited examples he provides can
be called into question, as tlley have been recently by
Bernard Rollin:

Perhaps Wittgenstein should have used other examples.
But in any case, it's clear enough by now that his
contention that some mental states are languagedependent is not a claim about mental states generally.
Still, some may remain unconvinced. After all,
Wittgenstein also made the startling claim that if a lion
could talk, we could not understand him. This might be
taken to mean that our lives are just different in kind
from lions and other animals, and a part of the difference
is the fact that we, and not they, are language users.
Here again, Rollin points out that there might indeed
be a great deal that a human and a lion might have to
talk about. And granting that there is much that we
would not have in common with this lion, we can readily
think of human beings whose forms oflife are similarly
unfamiliar to us (Rollin mentions accountants and
fundamentalists, but there are others): we can
understand them as well, or as badly, as we can
Wiugenstein's talking lion! But even if that is wrong,
the alleged difference, on Wiugenstein's account,
between a lion and a human is emphatically not the
difference of linguistic capacity. Indeed, the example
obliterates that distinction. Instead, the issue is whether
or not there are enough shared features of life in order
to make linguistic communication possible. The reason
we can't understand a lion is not that we and only we
have concepts, because we and only we use language.
The intelligibility of linguistic utterance is dependent
upon other features of a shared life. I think that Rollin is
right. Wittgenstein has indeed overlooked those features
of life that are shared between lions and humans in order
to make his point about the intelligibility of language.
But even if Rollin were wrong, the example does not
endorse attributing lack of conceptuality or mentality to
lions or other infraverbal organisms-quite the contrary.
Perhaps Wittgenstein's view with respect to the
possibility of animal mental life is most apparent if one
considers the simple state of being in pain. In the
Investigations, Wittgenstein says that in teaching
someone to say "I am in pain," we are teaching that
person a new pain behavior. Clearly, the ability to say

As to Wittgenstein's claims that an animal
can't hope or simulate pain, these are truly
perplexing. What else can one say of a dog
when it sits at attention while you are eating
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at the last moment veers off to a maple tree nearby. The
dog runs up to the oak, looks up into its branches, and
barks excitedly. If we observe this, Malcolm says, we
will want to say, "He thinks the cat went up that oak
tree." And to maintain with Descartes that animals do
not think would be an error. Nevertheless, Malcolm does
not want to credit the dog with having the mistaken
thought, "the cat is up this tree."
Malcolm's contention is not so much that it is
impossible for dogs or other animals to have thoughts.
The question is, what are the grounds for attributing
thoughts. As Malcolm puts the point, it is not a question
about whether or not a dog might have thoughts but,
rather, whether or not it can express thoughts. The
expression of the thought, "the cat is up the oak tree,"
like the expression of any thought, requires language,
according to Malcolm. A dog, or a human being for
that matter, might well behave as if she was having a
certain thought. These are cases of "thinking that p."
To have the thought-"that p" is a linguistically
dependentact. Indeed, on Malcolm's view, "the relation
between thought and language must be so close that it
is really senseless to conjecture that people may not
have thoughts, and also really senseless to conjecture
that animals may have thoughts."6
Malcolm's argument preserves the Wittgensteinian
intuition that language makes a crucial difference in
mental capacity while making a case against the
Cartesian denial of all mental states to animals.
Descartes' mistake, according to Malcolm, was that he
didn't grasp the distinction between having thoughts
and mere thinking. Animals may be credited, on this
view, with a wide range of intentional and conscious
states: they can feel, be angry, believe, fear, etc., but
they cannot have thoughts.
Malcolm's position is not without its difficulties,
however. Since Malcolm will not say what "thoughts"
are in general (he doesn't think that there's sensible
answer to that question), it's hard to get clear on just
why they cannot be sensibly attributed to animals.
Indeed, as Donald Weiss has shown, it's easy to
construct a counter-example to the contention that
thought requires language.? Weiss describes a fictional
languageless character, named Arthur, who engages in
a range of sophisticated intentional behavior that is
clearly best described not only in terms of thinking but
also of having thoughts. The moral of the story seems
to be that there just is no non-question-begging way to
exclude non-linguistic evidence for thought (after all,

those words is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for being in pain. Indeed, the words have
the sense that they have for us only in the context of
other natural pain behavior----(;rying, moaning, etc.
Such linguistic practices acquire their significance
from non-linguistic ones. Patricia Hanna argued the
point as follows:
Imagine a group of people who occasionally
utter the words "I'm in pain," but who never
exhibit any natural pain behavior; they would
be an enigma to us. We could not treat their
use of the words "I'm in pain" as meaning what
they would mean if used by us; but what other
sense might we ascribe to them?4
Pain behavior can take both linguistic and pre-linguistic
forms, but Hanna's very Wittgensteinian point is that
linguistic expressions of pain states are intelligible only
in the context of their non-linguistic surroundings. But
in this case the non-linguistic surroundings (Le., the
crying, moaning, etc.) already presuppose a conscious
mental life. I think Wittgenstein holds a similar position
with respect to mind and language generally. Consider
his remarks concerning the Cartesian claim that animals
cannot think:
It is sometimes said that animals do not talk
because they lack the mental capacity. And this
means: "They do not think, and that is why
they do not talk." But-they simply do not
talk. Or to put it better: they do not use
language-if we except the most primitive
forms of language.-Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a
part of our natural history as walking, eating,
drinking, playing. 5
II

While Wittgenstein does not draw the line between
human and animal minds as sharply as some suppose,
it is still clear enough that he does intend to draw a line
somewhere. But where and how? Wittgenstein's
student, Norman Malcolm, suggests a way of drawing
the linguistic line between humans and animals that
perhaps elucidates Wittgenstein's own view.
Malcolm considers a scenario where a dog is chasing
the neighbor's cat. The cat runs toward an oak tree but
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consider the case of human mutes!) Some may (and
have) resisted the fictional character ofWeiss' example.
Nevertheless, many ordinary cases of animal behavior
seem to require explication in terms of thoughts, not
just thinking. Gareth Matthews describes one such case
of a well-known ape:

necessary. After all, for Malcolm, the connection
between thought and language is logical, not evidential.
But such an obstinate refusal to attribute thoughts to
Arthur, Sultan, or Dennett's vervets on such grounds
would seem to amount to the bare stipulation that
connects thought to language.

... Sultan... was given two hollow sticks, one
of smaller diameter than the other. The smaller
one could be inserted into one end of the other
to make a single, longer stick. With the longer
stick Sultan would be equipped to fetch a
banana placed tantalizingly near the bars of
the cage. But as Sultan himself determined by
trial neither short stick, by itself, was long
enough to reach the banana. 8

III
Despite its difficulties, Malcolm's position is really
quite moderate on the issue of animal minds. Like
Wittgenstein, Malcolm allows for a fairly rich animal
psychology, even if he refuses to attribute thoughts to
them. Some, like Davidson, Frey, and Stich, have
followed a similar line of reasoning to the conclusion
that animals cannot be credited with having any
intentional states at all. While these views deserve
careful consideration, I will not examine them now. I
would like to comment briefly on part of Stich's position
on animal belief, though, because I think there is a
Wittgensteinian response to it. lO
Stich's contention has to do with the difficulty of
identifying the specific content of alleged animal belief.
The central argument is this. We can attribute beliefs to
a creature only if we can specify the contents of the
beliefs attributed. But if a creature lacks language, we
cannot specify its belief-contents. So, we cannot
attribute belief to creatures without language. Stich
argues that we cannot specify a belief-content for any
animal belief, and unless we can specify belief-content,
it is not clear in what sense we can explain animal
behavior by appealing to their beliefs. "It is absurd to
suggest that we can explain an animal's behavior in
tenns of beliefs and desires when we cannot say what
it is that the animal believes."" An animal like Malcolm's
dog cannot have the concept "oak tree" or for that matter
"cat." But if not, it is not clear what it is to attribute l1le
belief that the cat is up the oak tree to the dog.
This difficulty involving the content of animal belief
is only apparent. It can be removed as long as we don't
assume that the specific content of animal beliefs must
be identical to those oflinguistically competent humans,
as Richard Jeffrey has suggested:

Matthews goes on to describe the process whereby
Sultan learns that he can reach the banana by placing
the sticks together. He then contends, plausibly, that
Sultan's behavior is best explained by attributing the
following thoughts to Sultan: "The two sticks can be
put together to form a single stick" and "the double
stick can be used to reach the banana."
There are other impressive examples that strongly
invite explication in terms of creatures having attitudes
about the attitudes of other creatures. Dennett describes
the case of vervet monkeys who give a peculiar cry
that functions to warn others in the group of an
approaching leopard:
...one band of vervets was losing ground in a
territorial skirmish with another band. One of
the losing-side monkeys, temporarily out of
the fray, seemed to get a bright idea: it
suddenly issued a leopard alarm (in the
absence of any leopards), leading all the
vervets to take up the cry and head for the
trees-creating a truce and regaining the
ground his side had been losing. 9
This sort of evidence is, to be sure, anecdotal. But it
does strongly suggest that there are other grounds for
thought-even of fairly high order-than linguistic
competence. The vervet, like Sultan, engages in
behavior too complex not to be characterized in terms
of thought. Now, Malcolm's position could, nonetheless
be defended against such examples by simply insisting
that such cases credit animals with more than is
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Butcan one agree that the dog simply doesn't
have our concept of a tree without concluding
that the dog has no concept that we can
characterize (say, as 'marker a scratcher can
disappear up') that applies relevantly to that
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tree and that cat. I don't see why we can't
deploy a terminology apt for characterizing
those of the dog's beliefs and desires that
concern us without falling into the trap of using
terms that would only be apt for people. 12

they have beliefs, desires, perceptions, memory, a sense
of the future, goals, and most importantly, a welfare. A
dog may not believe its master will arrive the day after
tomorrow, but that's just to say that there are some
human stories that it doesn't participate in. According
to Richard Routley, from a canine perspective, there
are as many smells as there are things in the world. 15
Can't we say that from the dog's perspective, every
smell tells a story? The human olfactory awareness is
comparatively impoverished. So, there are many
canine "stories" that we don't participate in. But, I
want to claim, what is more significant is that there are
shared stories, in an admittedly broad sense, between
humans and animals.
Perhaps it is too odd to describe the conceptual life
of infralinguistic creatures in terms of stories. Stories
do provide context, but context can be provided
without, or at least prior to, stories. Even stories
require context, as Wittgenstein tries to demonstrate
in the Investigations, when he describes a very
primitive "builder's language." Part of the point there
was to show that meaning is to be understood in terms
of what we do. That is, human practices and activities
are what give rise to meaning. The only "story" that
Wittgenstein builders have is given in their activity.16
The sense of human stories must be understood in
connection with human activity-with human life
generally. The priority of human life and activity for
meaning sheds light on the nature of human morality
and the role that animals may play in it.
I don't want to argue about animal rights per se. I
don't know of anyone who seriously maintains that
animals have rights in the sense of meeting the
reciprocity condition. Of course, Regan and others deny
that moral agency is a necessary condition for having
rights, thus arguing for rights without reciprocity. And
here again, one could employ Wittgenstein's family
traits to argue that our conception of animal rights need
not include every feature of human rights. But I would
prefer to avoid the rights quagmire and talk instead
about the psychological and moral connection between
humans and animals. Cora Diamond has argued that
the recognition of human rights has lillie to do with an
impartial account of which mental states, complex or
not, other human beings have. 17 Rather, the sense of
moral community with another lies in the recognition
of one simply as a "fellow human being"-as Prof.
Hyde might say, "one of us." But Diamond suggests
similarly viewing animals as "fellow creatures" to

The differences in canine and human concepts are due
to our different "forms of life;" nevertheless, our
concepts overlap in many ways. We could adopt
something along the lines of Wittgenstein's notion of
"family resemblances"13 and thus replace the notion a
particular concept p with a family ofp-related concepts.
The cat chasing dog's concept of the tree is not identical
to our concept, but it is related to our concept and can
pick out the same object in the world.

IV
Denying animal mentality has had obvious tragic moral
implications for animals. But what of the more moderate
limitations proposed (albeit unsuccessfully) by
Wittgenstein and Malcolm? In a recent paper, William
Hyde, arguing in an explicitly Wittgensteinian spirit,
contended that the appropriate way to understand the
context for being able to ascribe complex mental states
to individuals is in terms of "stories."14 He suggests
that we think ofmental states, or at least complex mental
states, as story-states. Rather than conceiving of our
mental concepts as referring to inner brain or mind-states,
we are to understand them in relation to stories that
connect the concepts to other concepts. Only by locating
our mental concepts in the appropriate story context
can we understand them to be mental states at all.
Hyde draws the following consequences for the
possibility of animal rights. To have rights, a being must
have complex mental states. To have complex mental
states means having complex story states, and animals
don't have complex story-states. So, they don't have
rights. Without stories, no animal can count as "one of
us." Thus, on Hyde's view, animals may have moral
standing, but they cannot have rights. He also maintains
that the very concept of "rights" demands "reciprocity,"
a condition animals cannot meet.
Where Malcolm excluded animals from the realm
of thoughts, Hyde excludes them from the realm of
stories. In either case, they don't have rights. I suppose
that in allowing for animal concepts, I am allowing for
animal stories, if I may use that term. Many animals
are, as Tom Regan puts it, subjects-of-a-life; that is,
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9 Daniel Dennett, "Intentional Systems in Cognitive
Ethology: The 'Panglossian Paradigm' Defended," The
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6, 1983, p. 347.

whom we extend our pity and our sympathy. I find
Diamond's view to be attractive. And it is a view very
much in the Wittgensteinian spirit. I would only add
that sympathy and pity are appropriate only if we share
something with nonhuman animals. There is a
psychological connection here that gives the sympathy
and pity their point 18 To recognize an animal in this
way as a "fellow creature" is to that extent to see it as
"one of us." The lines between the species simply cannot
be sharply drawn.

10 It should be noted that unlike Davidson or Frey, Stich's
argument against animal belief forms a part of an argument
against beliefs and "folk psychology" generally.

II Stephen Stich, "Do Animals Have Beliefs?"
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57, 1979, p. 18.
12 Richard Jeffrey, "Animal Interpretation," in E. Le Pore
and B. McLaughlin, eds.,Actions and Events, New York: Basil
Blackwell. p. 485.
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